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The shape of public choice to come: Some predictions and advice

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science, University of Oregon, 97403, Eugene, OR

    William C. Mitchell

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  1. William C. Mitchell
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Mitchell, W.C. The shape of public choice to come: Some predictions and advice. Public Choice 77, 133–144 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01049226

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