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From economic imperialism to social science inspiration

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for Empirical Economic Research, University of Zurich, Blümlisalpstr. 10, CH-8006, Zurich

    Bruno S. Frey

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I am grateful for helpful comments to Margit Osterloh, Reiner Eichenberger, Beat Gygi, Angel Serna, Iris Bohnet, Ilda Ferro and Felix Oberholzer.

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Frey, B.S. From economic imperialism to social science inspiration. Public Choice 77, 95–105 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01049223

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