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Toward a presumption of efficiency in politics

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Conclusion

In the preceding pages, I have returned time and again to the idea that in the next quarter century the profession will devote more of its resources to an understanding of politics and of political organizations, with a presumption that the behaviors and institutions we observe in the real world represent efficient responses to exogenously given constraints and to competitive forces. That does not mean, of course, that normative preoccupations, critical evaluations and reformist drives will not continue to motivate a good number of scholars. That is to be expected and praised. However, I believe that in relative terms more attention will come to be given to understanding and less to re-designing and reforming. In this context, the economic approach to politics will flourish and, as an important carrier of these research results,Public Choice will continue to play an indispensable role. We can already see the future and it is promising.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, University of Toronto, M5S 1A1, Toronto, Ontario, Canada

    Albert Breton

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I would like to thank my colleagues of the Villa Colombella Group — Gianluigi Galeotti, Pierre Salmon and Ronald Wintrobe — for their useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. All remaining errors are, of course, my own. I would also like to thank the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation for its generous financial assistance.

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Breton, A. Toward a presumption of efficiency in politics. Public Choice 77, 53–65 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01049219

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