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Public Choice

, Volume 80, Issue 1–2, pp 173–189 | Cite as

Price-distorting compensation serving the consumer and taxpayer interest

  • William E. Foster
  • Gordon C. Rausser
Article

Keywords

Public Finance 
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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • William E. Foster
    • 1
  • Gordon C. Rausser
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Agricultural and Resource EconomicsNorth Carolina State UniversityRaleigh
  2. 2.Department of Agricultural and Resource EconomicsUniversity of CaliforniaBerkeley

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