Public Choice

, Volume 79, Issue 1–2, pp 83–104 | Cite as

Savings and loan and finance industry PAC contributions to incumbent members of the House Banking Committee

  • Randall W. Bennett
  • Christine Loucks


This paper examines the relationship between campaign contributions from savings and loan and finance industry PACs and membership on the House Banking Committee. The distinguishing features of this paper are that we focus on campaign contributions at an industry level, and we use regression analysis to determine whether membership on the House Banking Committee, the committee with oversight responsibility for the savings and loan industry, influences the level of contributions received by an individual legislator. We find that members of the House Banking Committee do receive significantly greater contributions from the savings and loan and finance PACs than do other members of Congress and that being chairman of the House Banking Committee also pays a dividend.


Regression Analysis Public Finance Great Contribution Industry Level Finance Industry 
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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Randall W. Bennett
    • 1
  • Christine Loucks
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Economics, School of Business AdministrationGonzaga UniversitySpokane
  2. 2.Department of Economics, College of BusinessBoise State University

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