Abstract
The purpose of the paper is to advocate that constitutions should be established through a contractarian process, rather than through conventions. To achieve it, they are studied from the perspective of the concept of common knowledge. We refer to its political philosophy and game theory dimensions. The making of common knowledge relates to communication and induction problems. The argument is applied to European constitutional integration, with a particular focus on administrative law.
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An earlier version was presented at the 1994 European Public Choice Society meeting, University of Valencia, Spain, and at the microeconomics seminar of the University of Montreal. We received helpful comment and constructive criticism by Friedrich Schneider and an anonymous referee. We are grateful to Leonard Dudley for his support. We would also like to thank David Chapman, Louis Lévy-Garboua, Jean Magnan de Bornier and Ulrich Witt. Their responsibility is not thereby committed.
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Josselin, JM., Marciano, A. Constitutionalism and common knowledge: Assessment and application to a future European constitution. Public Choice 85, 173–188 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01047910
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01047910