Abstract
This paper examines the industrial organization of the federal sector by measuring the variation of bureau market shares of appropriations. The two measures employed are rank-shift analysis (turnover) and the Hymer-Pashigian index of market share instability which have been used to indicate the level of competitiveness within private sector industries. The results of both the rank-shift and market share instability analyses strongly suggest that there is considerable competition among bureaus within the federal sector. These results are consistent with the hypothesis and existing evidence that bureaus engage in nonprice competitive strategies.
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The author wishes to thank Douglas Lamdin, Morgan Reynolds, William Fischel and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
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Carroll, K.A. Industrial structure of the federal sector: Evidence from bureau market share data. Public Choice 77, 611–627 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01047863
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01047863