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A general model of rent seeking for public goods

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Abstract

This paper generalizes the model of collective rent-seeking over a public good. Expanding the rent seeker's consumption bundle to include preferences over the public good and a private good, our results suggest collective rent-seeking is positively related to group size. Although free riding exists within a group, there is not a one-for-one tradeoff. In addition, rent seeking increases with wealth. Finally, total effort expended by both groups increases if either group increases in membership size, except in the case of an extremely lopsided contest. The key condition underlying these results is that the marginal utility of the public good is not inversely related to the private good.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Agricultural and Rural Development, Department of Economics, Iowa State University, 50011, Ames, IA

    Khalid Riaz, Jason F. Shogren & Stanley R. Johnson

  2. School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, Yale University, 06511, New Haven, CT

    Jason F. Shogren

Authors
  1. Khalid Riaz
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  2. Jason F. Shogren
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  3. Stanley R. Johnson
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Additional information

The authors thank Todd Sandler and Arnold Faden for several helpful discussions. Partial support was provided by the Institute for Policy Reform, funded by a grant from the U.S. Agency for International Development. All views remain our own.

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Riaz, K., Shogren, J.F. & Johnson, S.R. A general model of rent seeking for public goods. Public Choice 82, 243–259 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01047696

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01047696

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