Studia Logica

, Volume 51, Issue 3–4, pp 485–517 | Cite as

Time and modality in the logic of agency

  • Brian F. Chellas
Logic of Action

Abstract

Recent theories of agency (sees to it that) of Nuel Belnap and Michael Perloff are examined, particularly in the context of an early proposal of the author.

Keywords

Mathematical Logic Computational Linguistic Recent Theory Early Proposal 

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References

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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1992

Authors and Affiliations

  • Brian F. Chellas
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyThe University of CalgaryCalgaryCanada

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