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Corporate ownership and control structures: An international comparison

  • Varieties Of Capitalism: International Comparisons And Discussion
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Abstract

This paper analyzes the economic fundamentals of the corporate firm with publicly held shares and the salient characteristics of varying corporate systems, focusing on international differences in ownership and control structures, including alternative disciplinary mechanisms. Those international differences seem to influence economic behavior and corporate performance, including the way in which corporate restructurings take place. Market-oriented corporate systems and network-oriented corporate systems are likely to mutually converge in the future.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Tilburg University, The Netherlands

    Pieter W. Moerland

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  1. Pieter W. Moerland
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Moerland, P.W. Corporate ownership and control structures: An international comparison. Rev Ind Organ 10, 443–464 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01024230

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