Abstract
The Supreme Court erred by deciding that the proposition — that the Japanese television manufacturers, the defendants inMatsushita, had acted as independent competitors — had greater plausibility than the plaintiffs' charge that they had conspired to depress U.S. prices and take a large part of the U.S. market. Independent competitors would not have exported to the U.S., where prices were much below those in the home market. Moreover, the record evidence showed collusion in both the home and U.S. markets. Intent was also shown by the construction of large capacity to supply the U.S.
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Professor of Economics, New School for Social Research. I was co-author of Horace J. DePodwin, David Schwartzman, and Marcio Teixeira, "Economic Study of the Japanese Television Industry’, prepared for plaintiffs' counsel in the Japanese Electronic Products Litigation, M.D.L. 189, Civ. Nos. 74–2451 and 74–3247 in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, September 1979 [hereafter referred to as the DePodwin Report]. The present article is based on David Schwartzman,The Japanese Television Cartel: A Study Based on Matsushita v. Zenith (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1993).
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Schwartzman, D. Matsushita v. Zenith: An economic analysis. Rev Ind Organ 9, 57–70 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01024219
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01024219