Law and Philosophy

, Volume 14, Issue 2, pp 185–201 | Cite as

Rights, neutrality, and the oppressive power of the state

  • George Sher
Article
  • 51 Downloads

Keywords

Social Issue Oppressive Power 

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References

  1. 1.
    Benjamin Constant,Principles of Politics Applicable to All Representative Governments, inBenjamin Constant: Political Writings, trans. and ed. Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 176.Google Scholar
  2. 2.
    Judith Shklar,Ordinary Vices (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 237.Google Scholar
  3. 3.
    Ronald Dworkin, “Liberalism,” in hisA Matter of Principle (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 127.Google Scholar
  4. 4.
    Alasdair MacIntyre,After Virtue, second edition (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), p. 195.Google Scholar
  5. 5.
    This argument appears in chapter two of a manuscript still in progress entitledBeyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics.Google Scholar
  6. 6.
    Will Kymlicka, “Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality,”Ethics 99 (1989): 884.Google Scholar
  7. 7.
    Bruce Ackerman,Social Justice and the Liberal State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), p. 369.Google Scholar
  8. 8.
    Ibid., p. 363.Google Scholar
  9. 9.
    Thus, Jeremy Waldron quotes T. S. Eliot as opposing “the ideal of a neutral society” in a book that Eliot published just before the Second World War; but Waldron adds that “I have managed to find no evidence that any liberal view that Eliot was opposing was ever actually formulated in these terms” (Jeremy Waldron, “Legislation and Moral Neutrality,” in Robert E. Goodin and Andrew Reeve, eds.,Liberal Neutrality (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 62.Google Scholar
  10. 10.
    Shklar,Ordinary Vices, pp. 237–38.Google Scholar
  11. 11.
    In “Liberalism,” cited above.Google Scholar
  12. 12.
    Ibid., p. 197.Google Scholar
  13. 13.
    Ibid., p. 198.Google Scholar
  14. 14.
    Dworkin, “Liberalism,” p. 183; see also Will Kymlicka,Liberalism, Community, and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).Google Scholar
  15. 15.
    These phrases from the mission statement of the N.E.A. are from a passage cited by David Schwartz in “Can Intrinsic Value Theorists Justify Subsidies for Contemporary Art?”Public Affairs Quarterly, forthcoming.Google Scholar
  16. 16.
    Dworkin, “Liberalism,” p. 197.Google Scholar
  17. 17.
    For arguments to this effect, see Stephen Macedo,Liberal Virtues (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), ch. 5.Google Scholar
  18. 18.
    Dworkin, “Liberalism,” p. 197.Google Scholar
  19. 19.
    That this is Dworkin's motivation emerges clearly in “Liberalism,” p. 197.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • George Sher
    • 1
  1. 1.Dept. of PhilosophyRice UniversityHoustonUSA

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