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Optimal trade policy in the presence of changing market structure

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Abstract

This study examines the optimal use of tariff policy in response to a change in both the number and market behavior of domestic firms. The paper demonstrates that under certain demand conditions, optimal trade policy may require an increase in tariffs in response to an increase in consolidation or collusion among domestic firms.

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Herander, M.G. Optimal trade policy in the presence of changing market structure. Open Econ Rev 4, 235–245 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01000043

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