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Believing the improbable

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, The University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, 53201, Milwaukee, WI, USA

    Mark Kaplan

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  1. Mark Kaplan
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I would like to thank Brad Armendt, Patrick Maher, Bas Van Fraassen and Joan Weiner for comments on this (and/or earlier versions of this) paper. I have also benefited from conversation and correspondence with Stewart Cohen. Some of the research of which this paper was a product was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation.

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Kaplan, M. Believing the improbable. Philos Stud 77, 117–146 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00996315

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