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While self-contained, this paper is a sequel to my “Belief and the Will” (1984); see theBibliographical Note at the end of this paper for a survey of the relevant literature since then and supplementary references. I have meanwhile benefitted greatly from Brad Armendt's commentary and Richard Foley's “How should future opinion affect current opinion?”, both presented at a symposium at the APA Central Division, April 1993.
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van Fraassen, B.C. Belief and the problem of Ulysses and the sirens. Philos Stud 77, 7–37 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00996309