Skip to main content

Belief and the problem of Ulysses and the sirens

This is a preview of subscription content, access via your institution.

References

  1. Bacchus, F., H. E. Kyburg Jr., and M. Thalos (1990) ‘Against Conditionalization’,Synthese 85, 475–506.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Bernardo, J. M. et al. (eds.) (1985)Bayesian Statistics 2 (Amsterdam: Elsevier Science Publishers).

    Google Scholar 

  3. Christensen, D. (1991) ‘Clever Bookies and Coherent Beliefs’,Philosophical Review, 229–247.

  4. Dunn, J. M. and A. Gupta (eds.) (1990)Truth or Consequences (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers).

    Google Scholar 

  5. Elster, J. (1979)Ulysses and the Sirens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  6. Gaifman, H. (1988) ‘A Theory of Higher Order Probabilities’, in Skyrms and Harper (1988), 191–219.

  7. Goldstein, M. (1983) ‘The Prevision of a Prevision’,Journal of the American Statistical Association 78, 817–819.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Goldstein, M. (1985) ‘Temporal Coherence’, in Bernardo et al. (1985), 231–248.

  9. Jeffrey, R. (1988) ‘Conditioning, Kinematics, and Exchangeability’, in Skyrms and Harper (1988), 221–255.

  10. Lewis, D. K. (1979) ‘Attitudes De Dicto and De Se’,Philosophical Review 88, 513–543; reprinted in hisCollected Papers I (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).

    Google Scholar 

  11. Maher, P. (1992) ‘Diachronic Rationality’,Philosophy of Science 59, 120–141.

    Google Scholar 

  12. McNeill, I. B. and G. Umphrey (eds.) (1987)Advances in the Statistical Sciences, II (Dordrecht: Reidel Pub. Co.).

    Google Scholar 

  13. Mellor, D. H. (ed.) (1980)Prospects for Pragmatism (Cambridge University Press).

  14. Savage, C. Wade (ed.) (1987)Justification, Discovery, and the Evolution of Scientific Theories (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press).

    Google Scholar 

  15. Seidenfeld, T. (1985) ‘Calibration, Coherence, and Scoring Rules’,Philosophy of Science 52, 274–294.

    Google Scholar 

  16. Skyrms, B. ‘Higher Order Degrees of Belief’, in Mellor (1980), 109–137.

  17. Skyrms, B. (1987a) ‘Dynamic Coherence’, in McNeill and Umphrey (1987), 233–243.

  18. Skyrms, B. (1987b) ‘Dynamic Coherence and Probability Kinematics’,Philosophy of Science 54, 1–20.

    Google Scholar 

  19. Skyrms, B. (1987c) ‘The Value of Knowledge’, in Savage (1987).

  20. Skyrms, B. (1990)The Dynamics of Rational Deliberation (Harvard University Press).

  21. Skyrms, B. and W. H. Harper (eds.) (1988)Causation, Chance, and Credence 1 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers).

    Google Scholar 

  22. Sobel, J. H. ‘Evidential Bearings, Rational Updates, and Dutch Strategies’, ms. 1990.

  23. Sobel, J. H. (1987) ‘Self-doubts and Dutch Strategies’,Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65, 56–81.

    Google Scholar 

  24. Talbot, W. J. (1991) ‘Two Principles of Bayesian Epistemology’,Philosophical Studies 62 (1991), 135–150.

    Google Scholar 

  25. van Fraassen, B. (1984) ‘Belief and the Will’,Journal of Philosophy 81, 235–256.

    Google Scholar 

  26. van Fraassen, B. (1989)Laws and Symmetry (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

    Google Scholar 

  27. van Fraassen, B. (1990) ‘Figures in a Probability Landscape’, in Dunn and Gupta (1990), 345–356.

Download references

Author information

Affiliations

Authors

Additional information

While self-contained, this paper is a sequel to my “Belief and the Will” (1984); see theBibliographical Note at the end of this paper for a survey of the relevant literature since then and supplementary references. I have meanwhile benefitted greatly from Brad Armendt's commentary and Richard Foley's “How should future opinion affect current opinion?”, both presented at a symposium at the APA Central Division, April 1993.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and Permissions

About this article

Cite this article

van Fraassen, B.C. Belief and the problem of Ulysses and the sirens. Philos Stud 77, 7–37 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00996309

Download citation