Abstract
The paper contrasts the value of information at the private level with the social value when all voters have access to information. A sequence of examples illustrates how the private and social value of information changes as the distribution of benefits and costs derived from a project varies across individuals and states of the world.
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Gersbach, H. The private and social value of information in majority decisions. Polit Behav 15, 15–23 (1993). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00993414
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00993414