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For helpful comments and suggestions I thank Bill Lycan, David Sanford, John Tienson, Mark Timmons, Steven Wagner, and the audience at the Oberlin Colloquium. Special thanks to Frances Egan for her probing commentary.
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Horgan, T. Naturalism and intentionality. Philos Stud 76, 301–326 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00989833
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00989833