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A test of candidate equilibrium

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Abstract

Richard McKelvey predicts that candidates will converge to an equilibrium if candidates and voters maximize their utility and voters' preferences conform to stringent assumptions. Although there are discrepancies between electoral data and the requirements of the theory, an analysis of 1972 and 1976 survey data lends support to basic components of the theory. First, most voters did choose the candidate who provided the greater utility. Second, voter distribution was not asymmetrical enough to allow a candidate to win by moving away from the median toward a concentration of voters. Third, the winning strategy for a candidate was to locate at or near the median. While formal theories' predictions will not hold in their precisely stated form, the assumptions can be robust enough to offer an explanation of electoral choices.

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Davis, S. A test of candidate equilibrium. Polit Behav 9, 29–48 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00987277

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00987277

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