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Arguments against the possibility of perfect rationality

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Abstract

Many different arguments against the possibility of perfect rationality have appeared in the literature, and these target several different conceptions of perfect rationality. It is not clear how these different conceptions of perfect rationality are related, nor is it clear how the arguments showing their impossibility are related, and it is especially unclear what the impossibility results show when taken together. This paper gives an exposition of the different conceptions of perfect rationality, an the various sorts of argument against them; clarifies which conceptions of perfect rationality are targeted by which arguments; and finally attempts to systematize the results available to date.

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Reiner, R. Arguments against the possibility of perfect rationality. Mind Mach 5, 373–389 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00974751

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