Skip to main content
Log in

On Cournot-Nash equilibria with exogenous uncertainty

  • Contributed Papers
  • Published:
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

A large body of literature has accumulated which examines how the optimal solution of an agent maximizing the expectation of a real-valued function, depending on a random parameterp and the agent's behaviorx, reacts to perturbations in the first and second moments ofp. Here, by an approximation valid for small uncertainty, we allow many agents and consider their behavior in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium. We also allowp to depend on the behaviors of the participating agents. We apply the analysis to two models, one of a Cournot oligopoly, the other of a cooperative of individuals where there is uncertainty in the return to communal work.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

References

  1. Rothschild, M., andStiglitz, J. E.,Increasing Risk, I: A Definition, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 2, pp. 225–243, 1970.

    Google Scholar 

  2. Rothschild, M., andStiglitz, J. E.,Increasing Risk, II: Its Economic Consequences, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 3, pp. 66–84, 1971.

    Google Scholar 

  3. Sandmo, A.,On the Theory of the Competitive Firm under Price Uncertainty, American Economic Review, Vol. 61, pp. 65–73, 1971.

    Google Scholar 

  4. Ishii, Y.,On the Theory of the Competitive Firm under Price Uncertainty: Note, American Economic Review, Vol. 67, pp. 768–769, 1977.

    Google Scholar 

  5. Ireland, N. J., andLaw, P. J.,The Economics of Labor-Managed Enterprises, Croom Helm, London, England, 1982.

    Google Scholar 

  6. Ireland, N. J.,The Analogy between Parameter Uncertainty and Parameter Change, Economics Letters, Vol. 6, pp. 301–308, 1980.

    Google Scholar 

  7. Bonin, J. P.,Work Incentives and Uncertainty on a Collective Farm, Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 1, pp. 77–97, 1977.

    Google Scholar 

  8. Ireland, N. J., andLaw, P. J.,Private Plot Restrictions in a Collective Farm Model, Canadian Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, pp. 475–485, 1980.

    Google Scholar 

  9. Oi, W. Y., andClayton, E. S.,A Peasant's View of a Soviet Collective Farm, American Economic Review, Vol. 58, pp. 37–59, 1968.

    Google Scholar 

  10. Sertel, M. R.,Workers and Incentives, North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, Holland, 1982.

    Google Scholar 

  11. Ireland, N. J., andLaw, P. J.,Efficiency, Incentives, and Individual Labor Supply in the Labor-Managed Firm, Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 5, pp. 1–23, 1981.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Additional information

Communicated by G. Leitmann

The second and third authors are grateful to the British Council (Academic Links and Interchange Scheme) for financial support.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Aaftink, J., Ireland, N. & Sertel, M. On Cournot-Nash equilibria with exogenous uncertainty. J Optim Theory Appl 49, 349–365 (1986). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00941066

Download citation

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00941066

Key Words

Navigation