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The core of a cooperative game without side payments

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Abstract

For cooperative games without side payments, there are several types of conditions which guarantee nonemptiness of the core, for example balancedness and convexity. In the present paper, a general condition for nonempty core is introduced which includes the known ones as special cases. Moreover, it is shown that every game with nonempty core satisfies this condition.

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Communicated by W. Stadler

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Keiding, H., Thorlund-Petersen, L. The core of a cooperative game without side payments. J Optim Theory Appl 54, 273–288 (1987). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00939435

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