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Additional aspects of the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games

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Abstract

The Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games is a reasonable solution concept for games where, either due to lack of information on the part of one player about the performance function of the other, or due to different speeds in computing the strategies, or due to differences in size or strength, one player dominates the entire game by imposing a solution which is favorable to himself. This paper discusses some properties of this solution concept when the players use controls that are functions of the state variables of the game in addition to time. The difficulties in determining such controls are also pointed out. A simple two-stage finite state discrete game is used to illustrate these properties.

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Coordinated Science Laboratory and Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois

    M. Simaan (Research Associate) & J. B. Cruz Jr. (Professor)

Authors
  1. M. Simaan
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  2. J. B. Cruz Jr.
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Additional information

Communicated by Y. C. Ho

This work was supported in part by the U.S. Air Force under Grant No. AFOSR-68-1579D, in part by NSF under Grant No. GK-36276, and in part by the Joint Services Electronics Program under Contract No. DAAB-07-72-C-0259 with the Coordinated Science Laboratory, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois.

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Simaan, M., Cruz, J.B. Additional aspects of the Stackelberg strategy in nonzero-sum games. J Optim Theory Appl 11, 613–626 (1973). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00935561

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00935561

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