Abstract
Under the hypothesis of a myopic electorate, vote-loss-minimizing behavior by the party in power, subject to a dynamic inflation-unemployment relation, is shown to generate an attractive, stable electoral policy cycle. The model presented is derived, with some improvements, from the analogous models of MacRae and Nordhaus. Furthermore, an attempt is made to specify the mathematical aspects of the problem by the Poincaré mapping.
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Communicated by M. D. Intriligator
This work was realized within the activities of CNR, Gruppo Nazionale Analisi Funzionale (GNAFA). The author wishes to thank Professor M. D. Intriligator for his many comments, suggestions, and critique.
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Montrucchio, L. Some mathematical aspects of the political business cycle. J Optim Theory Appl 37, 251–275 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00934770
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00934770