Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications

, Volume 39, Issue 1, pp 133–141 | Cite as

A note on the strategic adoption of a new technology

  • J. F. Reinganum
Technical Note

Abstract

This note reports an application of two-person, nonzero-sum game theory to a problem in the economics of technology adoption. It extends the analysis of a previous paper to consider differentiable mixed-strategy equilibria. In this case, the mixed-strategy equilibrium has a natural interpretation as a pure strategy equilibrium in an appropriately defined differential game.

Key Words

Mixed strategies differential games technology adoption 

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References

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Copyright information

© Plenum Publishing Corporation 1983

Authors and Affiliations

  • J. F. Reinganum
    • 1
  1. 1.California Institute of TechnologyPasadena

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