A note on the strategic adoption of a new technology
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This note reports an application of two-person, nonzero-sum game theory to a problem in the economics of technology adoption. It extends the analysis of a previous paper to consider differentiable mixed-strategy equilibria. In this case, the mixed-strategy equilibrium has a natural interpretation as a pure strategy equilibrium in an appropriately defined differential game.
Key WordsMixed strategies differential games technology adoption
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