Abstract
In this paper, we consider the family of allm×n bimatrix games, whose payoff entries are the players' orderings of the outcomes, and count the fraction of games whose Stackelberg solution is the leader'sh th best outcome and the follower'sk th best outcome (h,k≤mn). We conclude that the average leader and follower enjoy symmetric prospects, and that the advantage lies not in the leadership role, but in the relative size of the player's strategy space.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
References
Alkan, A., andSertel, M. R.,The Pretend-But-Perform Mechanism in Sharecropping, Paper Presented at the Workshop on Economics of Internal Organization, IIM, Berlin, Germany, 1980.
Von Stackelberg, H.,Marktform und Gleichgewicht, Julius Springer, Berlin, Germany, 1934.
Von Stackelberg, H.,The Theory of the Market Economy, Translation and Introduction by A. T. Peacock, William Hodge, London, England, 1952.
Ono, Y.,The Kinked Demand Curve: A Theoretical Approach, Discussion Paper, Workshop in Theoretical Economics, ICERD, London School of Economics, London, England, 1979.
Moulin, H.,Deterrence and Cooperation, European Economic Review, Volume 15, pp. 179–193, 1981.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Additional information
Communicated by G. Leitmann
This work was supported by the Boğaziçi University Research Center.
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Alkan, A., Brown, T. & Sertel, M.R. Probabilistic prospects of Stackelberg leader and follower. J Optim Theory Appl 39, 379–389 (1983). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00934544
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00934544