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A class of differential games for which the closed-loop and open-loop Nash equilibria coincide

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications volume 36, pages 253–262 (1982)Cite this article

Abstract

It is well known that, in general, Nash equilibria in open-loop strategies do not coincide with those in closed-loop strategies. This note identifies a class of differential games in which the Nash equilibrium in closed-loop strategies is degenerate, in the sense that it depends on time only. Consequently, the closed-loop equilibrium is also an equilibrium in open-loop strategies.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California

    J. F. Reinganum (Assistant Professor of Economics)

Authors
  1. J. F. Reinganum
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Additional information

Communicated by G. Leitmann

The helpful comments of Professors Y. C. Ho, G. Leitmann, H. Y. Wan, Jr., and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged.

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Reinganum, J.F. A class of differential games for which the closed-loop and open-loop Nash equilibria coincide. J Optim Theory Appl 36, 253–262 (1982). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00933832

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00933832

Key Words

  • Differential games
  • Nash equilibria
  • open-loop strategies
  • closed-loop strategies