Abstract
This paper considers a class of two-player, nonzero-sum games in which the players have only local, as opposed to global, information about the payoff functions. We study various modes of behavior and their relationship to different stability properties of the Nash equilibrium points.
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Communicated by Y. C. Ho
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Case, J.H., Kimeldorf, G. On Nash equilibrium points and games of imperfect information. J Optim Theory Appl 9, 302–323 (1972). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00932931
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00932931