Abstract
A class of differential games consisting of three players is presented. It is assumed that two of them, forming a coalition and working together, oppose the other. Under some additional assumptions, an optimality criterion for the players who form a coalition is proposed.
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Communicated by G. Leitmann
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Tanimoto, S. On a class of three-player differential games. J Optim Theory Appl 25, 469–473 (1978). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00932908
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00932908