Empirica

, Volume 14, Issue 2, pp 213–226 | Cite as

Adverse selection and imperfect monitoring in a labour market: Some game-theoretic remarks

  • Gerhard Clemenz
Article
  • 36 Downloads

Keywords

Economic Growth Labour Market International Economic Industrial Organization Adverse Selection 

Zusammenfassung

In einer früheren Arbeit hat der Autor gezeigt, daß eine Erweiterung des Effizienzlohnmodells mit adverser Selektion um unvollkommene und kostspielige Leistungskontrolle die Möglichkeit von Lohnrigiditäten und unfreiwilliger Arbeitslosigkeit nicht beseitigt. Allerdings muß ein Nash-Gleichgewicht nicht existieren, und das Riley-Gleichgewicht ist nicht eindeutig. Daher wird der Ansatz als dreistufiges Spiel neu modelliert und gezeigt, daß Nash-Gleichgewichte stets existieren und von diesen jenes mit Einheitslohn und (möglicher) unfreiwilliger Arbeitslosigkeit das plausibelste ist.

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Copyright information

© Gustav Fischer 1987

Authors and Affiliations

  • Gerhard Clemenz
    • 1
  1. 1.Institut für WirtschaftswissenschaftenUniversität WienWien

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