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A logic of believing, knowing, and inferring

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Eberle, R.A. A logic of believing, knowing, and inferring. Synthese 26, 356–382 (1974). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00883100

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00883100