Summary
Gibsonian ecological psychology, symbolic information processing, and connectionist information processing are frequently construed as three competing paradigms or research traditions, each seeking dominance in experimental psychology and in cognitive science generally. There is an important element of truth in this perspective, and any adequate account of the development of experimental psychology over the past 30 years would have to examine seriously how the various conceptual frameworks, experimental endeavors, and social institutions have figured in this conflict. But the goal of this paper is not to characterize the historical dynamics within experimental psychology and cognitive science; rather, it is to consider what sorts of rapprochement is possible. Rapprochement, however, is not sought simply for its own sake or out of an a priori conviction that scientific enterprises should be unified. Spirited controversy between competing traditions is often an important component of progess (Laudan, 1977). Rapprochement has a purpose when alternative theoretical traditions have reached a point when each confronts serious shortcomings that can best be overcome by incorporating alternative perspectives. In this paper I try to show that this is the situation that exists in experimental psychology and cognitve science generally with respect to the three traditions enumerated above. I first explore how cognitive inquiry directed at internal procedures for processing information could benefit from a detailed study of the context of cognition, including insights provided by the Gibsonian tradition. Second, I examine the current controversy between symbolic and connectionist approaches and address the question of what contributions each offers to the other. Finally, I offer a framework in which multiple levels of inquiry in cognitve science can be related.
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Bechtel, W. Multiple levels of inquiry in cognitive science. Psychol. Res 52, 271–281 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00877535
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00877535