Summary
Information-processing systems can be characterized by their ability to transform systematically certain internal representational states (symbols) into one another. The presence of such an information-processing capacity calls for an explanation. How could such an explanation in principle be formulated? How is it possible to specify internal representational states and to ascribe to them certain representational contents? What has to be demonstrated by such explanations is how an information-processing capacity is actually instantiated in a system. In this paper, the outlines of an explanation by instantiation are sketched for a specific human visual capacity. In addition, some fundamental problems facing the development of this explanation will be discussed.
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Eimer, M. Representational content and computation in the human visual system. Psychol. Res 52, 238–242 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00877532
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00877532