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A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution

Abstract

For a simple economic model of transfrontier pollution, widely used in theoretical studies of international treaties bearing on joint abatement, we offer in this paper a scheme for sharing national abatement costs through international financial transfers that is inspired by a classical solution concept from the theory of cooperative games—namely, the core of a game. The scheme has the following properties: total damage and abatement costs in all countries are minimized (optimality property), and no coalition or subset of countries can achieve lower total costs for its members by taking another course of action in terms of emissions or transfers, under some reasonable assumption about the reactions of those not in the coalition (core property). In the concluding section economic interpretations of the scheme are proposed, including its connection with the free-riding problem.

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Chander, P., Tulkens, H. A core-theoretic solution for the design of cooperative agreements on transfrontier pollution. Int Tax Public Finan 2, 279–293 (1995). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00877502

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Key words

  • cost of abatement
  • damage function
  • free riding
  • partial agreement Nash equilibrium
  • γ andα cores
  • optimal emission policy
  • international transfers