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Intentions, actions and routines: A problem in Krister Segerberg's theory of action

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to make a critical assessment of Krister Segerberg's theory of action. The first part gives a critical presentation of the key concepts in Segerberg's informal theory of action. These are the ideas that motivate the formal models he develops. In the second part it is argued that if one takes all of Segerberg's motivating ideas seriously, problems are forthcoming. The main problem is that on this theory the agents seem to be bound to realize all of their intentions, a problem that stems from Segerberg's attempt to individuate actions in terms of the agent's intentions. On the ground that this unfortunate result is forthcoming in both of Segerberg's approaches to the logic of action it is concluded that the conceptual basis of the theory is problematic.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, University of Oslo, Boks 1102, Blindern, N-0317, Oslo 3, Norway

    Dag Elgesem

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  1. Dag Elgesem
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Elgesem, D. Intentions, actions and routines: A problem in Krister Segerberg's theory of action. Synthese 85, 153–177 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00873199

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