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Realisms

Abstract

It is argued that the general thesis of realism is ill-defined, as are various versions of its denial. Only specific theses of the form ‘There areK's’ make clear sense. It is also argued that various efforts to deny realism always turn out to deny specific existential theses. Thus, it is argued, van Fraassen and Schwartz deny the existence of electrons.

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Levin, M. Realisms. Synthese 85, 115–138 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00873197

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00873197

Keywords

  • Clear Sense
  • General Thesis