Can there be one-way causal conditionship?
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I defend my attempt to explain causal priority by means of one-way causal conditionship by answering an argument by J. A. Cover about Charles' law. Then I attempt to say what makes a philosophical analysis a counterfactual analysis, so I can understand Cover's claim that my account is “at its base a counterfactual one”. Finally I examine Cover's discussion of my contention that “necessary for in the circumstances” is nontransitive.
KeywordsPhilosophical Analysis Counterfactual Analysis Causal Priority Causal Conditionship
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