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Can there be one-way causal conditionship?

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Abstract

I defend my attempt to explain causal priority by means of one-way causal conditionship by answering an argument by J. A. Cover about Charles' law. Then I attempt to say what makes a philosophical analysis a counterfactual analysis, so I can understand Cover's claim that my account is “at its base a counterfactual one”. Finally I examine Cover's discussion of my contention that “necessary for in the circumstances” is nontransitive.

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References

  • Cover, J. A.: 1987, ‘Causal Priority and Causal Conditionship’,Synthese 71, 19–36.

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  • Sanford, D. H.: 1976, ‘The Direction of Causation and the Direction of Conditionship’,The Journal of Philosophy 73, 193–207.

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  • Sanford, D. H.: 1985, ‘Causal Dependence and Multiplicity’,Philosophy 60, 215–230.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy, Duke University, 27708, Durham, NC, USA

    David H. Sanford

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  1. David H. Sanford
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Sanford, D.H. Can there be one-way causal conditionship?. Synthese 76, 397–408 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00869608

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00869608

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