, Volume 76, Issue 3, pp 397–408 | Cite as

Can there be one-way causal conditionship?

  • David H. Sanford


I defend my attempt to explain causal priority by means of one-way causal conditionship by answering an argument by J. A. Cover about Charles' law. Then I attempt to say what makes a philosophical analysis a counterfactual analysis, so I can understand Cover's claim that my account is “at its base a counterfactual one”. Finally I examine Cover's discussion of my contention that “necessary for in the circumstances” is nontransitive.


Philosophical Analysis Counterfactual Analysis Causal Priority Causal Conditionship 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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  1. Cover, J. A.: 1987, ‘Causal Priority and Causal Conditionship’,Synthese 71, 19–36.Google Scholar
  2. Sanford, D. H.: 1976, ‘The Direction of Causation and the Direction of Conditionship’,The Journal of Philosophy 73, 193–207.Google Scholar
  3. Sanford, D. H.: 1985, ‘Causal Dependence and Multiplicity’,Philosophy 60, 215–230.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1988

Authors and Affiliations

  • David H. Sanford
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyDuke UniversityDurhamUSA

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