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References

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A draft of this paper was read in April 1983 to the philosophy department of the University of Hawaii at Manoa. The author wishes to thank Professor Kenneth Kipnis of that university for lending him a copy of [7], which develops a notion of procedure somewhat similar to that of the notion of routine presented here. There would seem to be two main general differences between Kipnis' work and ours. One is Kipnis' ambition to outline an analysis of our entire conceptual framework; here it is only notions from the philosophy of action that are analysed. The other is the present author's concern, absent in Kipnis' work, to relate the philosophy of action to the tradition in intensional logic associated with the names of Carnap, Prior, Kripke, Scott, and Montague and of which he sees the dynamic logic of Pratt and others as a continuation (see [8], [9], [10]).

A draft of the first half of the paper was read as the informal part of the author's address to the Annual Meeting of the Society for Exact Philosophy in Vancouver, 21–23 April 1983. The formal, more exact, part of that address will appear along with other papers from that conference inTopoi.

The author should also like to thank John Bishop, Jim Evans, and Doug Walton for helpful discussions.

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Segerberg, K. Routines. Synthese 65, 185–210 (1985). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00869299

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