Conclusion
In the face of the considerations set forth above, I submit that Anderson's proposed definition (D) does not represent an acceptable construction of the concept of conditional permission. This, in turn, suggests that conditional permission must be viewed as a viable deontic relationship in its own right, and is not definable in terms of unconditional deontic concepts. It appears, then, that a reduction of conditional to unconditional deontic logic is not warranted.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Rescher, N., Anderson, A.R. Conditional permission in deontic logic. Philosophical Studies 13, 1–8 (1962). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00818099
Received:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00818099