Abstract
There is a considerable effort in current theorizing about psychological phenomena to eliminate minds and selves as a vestige of “folk” theories. The pertinent strategies are quite varied and may focus on experience, cognition, interests, responsibility, behavior and the scientific explanation of these phenomena or what they purport to identify. The minimal function of the notion of “self” is to assign experience to a suitable entity and to fix such ascription in a possessive as well as a predicative way. It is usually argued that Hume formulated an empiricist account of experience that obviated the need for reference to selves; and recent arguments mustered by Derek Parfit claim to show how to preserve experience, interest, responsibility usually assigned selves and persons without invoking any such entities. The argument here advanced demonstrates that Hume actually concedes the minimal use of the notion of self, that there appear to be no convincing grounds for eliminating it, that there are critical uses for the notion that render it ineliminable, that admission is neutral regarding the nature of selves, and that Parfit's arguments in particular fail. There appear, therefore, to be no empiricist or materialist grounds for the eliminative move. A large recent literature that favors various eliminative strategies is canvassed and shown to be inadequate to its task and unlikely (for principled reasons) to be able to achieve its eliminative objective.
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Margolis, J. Minds, selves, and persons. Topoi 7, 31–45 (1988). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00776207
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00776207