Abstract
Fuller's program of social epistemology engages a rhetoric of inquiry that can be usefully compared and contrasted with other discursive theories of knowledge, such as that of Richard Rorty. Resisting the model of “conversation,” Fuller strikes an activist posture and lays the groundwork for normative “knowledge policy,” in which persuasion and credibility play key roles. The image of investigation is one that overtly rejects the “storehouse” conception of knowledge and invokes the metaphors of distributive economics. Productive questions arise as to how notions of creation and distribution might guide this rhetoric.
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Lyne, J. Social epistemology as a rhetoric of inquiry. Argumentation 8, 111–124 (1994). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00733364
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00733364