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Family ties and social security in a democracy

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Fern Universität Hagen, Postfach 940, D-5800, Hagen

    Friedrich Breyer

  2. Universität Hannover, Wunstorfer Str. 14, D-3000, Hannover 91

    J.-Matthias Graf Von Der Schulenburg

Authors
  1. Friedrich Breyer
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  2. J.-Matthias Graf Von Der Schulenburg
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Additional information

The authors are grateful to David Audretsch, Christian Seidl, participants of a seminar at the University of Hannover and the Editor of this journal for valuable comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

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Breyer, F., Von Der Schulenburg, JM.G. Family ties and social security in a democracy. Public Choice 67, 155–167 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00714396

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