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Allocation patterns of PAC monies: The U.S. Senate

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, George Mason University, 4400 University Drive, 22030-4444, Fairfax, VA

    Kevin B. Grier

  2. Department of Government, University of Texas, 78712-1087, Austin, TX

    Michael C. Munger

  3. Public Utilities Commission of Texas, 7800 Shoal Creek, 78757, Austin, TX

    Gary M. Torrent

Authors
  1. Kevin B. Grier
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  2. Michael C. Munger
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  3. Gary M. Torrent
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Grier, K.B., Munger, M.C. & Torrent, G.M. Allocation patterns of PAC monies: The U.S. Senate. Public Choice 67, 111–128 (1990). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00714394

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00714394

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