Environmental and Resource Economics

, Volume 4, Issue 2, pp 151–169 | Cite as

Taxesversus tradable discharge permits: A review in the light of the U.S. and European experience

  • Charles W. Howe


The U.S. and West European environmental protection programs have incorporated different economic instruments for controlling pollution. The U.S. has made extensive use of tradable permits of several forms but has never used direct pollution taxes. The countries of the European Community have long used an array of pollution taxes but have never used tradable permits. A review and critique of these experiences and an analysis of the attributes of taxes and tradable permits seeks identify the strengths and weaknesses of each instrument and to provide guidelines for the successful implementation of each system.

Key words

Tradable permits effluent taxes environmental policy 


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Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Charles W. Howe
    • 1
  1. 1.Environment & Behavior Program, Institute of Behavioral ScienceUniversity of ColoradoBoulderUSA

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