Where is an object before you look at it?

Abstract

According to the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM), no meaning can be assigned to the statement that a particle has a precise value of any one of the variables describing its physical propertes before having interacted with a suitable measuring instrument. On the other hand, it is well known that QM tends to classical statistical mechanics (CSM) when a suitable classical limit is performed. One may ask therefore how is it that in this limit, the statement, meaningless in QM, that a given variable has always a precise value independently of having been measured, gradually becomes meaningful. In other words, one may ask how can it be that QM, which is a theory describing the intrinsically probabilistic properties of a quantum object, becomes a statistical theory describing a probabilistic knowledge of intrinsically well determined properties of classical objects.

In the present paper we try to answer to this question and show that an inconsistency arises between the conventional interpretation of CSM which presupposes objectively existing Newtonian trajectories, and the standard interpretation of QM. We conclude that the latter needs revisiting unnless we wish to adopt a strictly subjective conception of the world around us, implying that macroscopic objects as well are not localized anywhere before we look at them.