Abstract
This paper examines a potential problem area for theories of direct reference: that of the substitution of co-referential names within the belief context of a belief attribution used to explain an action. Of particular interest are action explanations which involve cases of repetition — wherein beliefs are held which, though about one (other) individual, are mistakenly thought to concern two different people. It is argued that, despite the commonly held view to the contrary, no problem is posed by substitution in such circumstances to theories of direct reference.
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Bryans, J. Substitution and the explanation of action. Erkenntnis 37, 365–376 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00666228
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00666228