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This is an extensively revised version of a paper delivered at a conference on knowledge, belief and strategic interaction, at Castiglioncello, Italy, in June of 1989. The earlier paper, entitled “Rational Choice in the Context of Ideal Games,” will be published in the proceedings of that conference,Knowledge, Belief and Strategic Interaction, ed. by C. Bicchieri and M. L. Dalla Chiara (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming, 1992). In this present form it was the basis for a talk given at a session on game theory, at the Pacific APA, March 1991.
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McClennen, E. The theory of rationality for ideal games. Philos Stud 65, 193–215 (1992). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00571324
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00571324