Abstract
For some time now, academic philosophers of mathematics have concentrated on intramural debates, the most conspicuous of which has centered on Benacerraf's epistemological challenge. By the late 1980s, something of a consensus had developed on how best to respond to this challenge. But answering Benacerraf leaves untouched the more advanced epistemological question of how the axioms are justified, a question that bears on actual practice in the foundations of set theory. I suggest that the time is ripe for philosophers of mathematics to turn outward, to take on a problem of real importance for mathematics itself.
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Maddy, P. Philosophy of mathematics: Prospects for the 1990s. Synthese 88, 155–164 (1991). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00567743
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00567743