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Axiomatizing Belnap's conditional assertion

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References

  1. N.D. Belnap, Jr., ‘Conditional Assertion and Restricted Quantification’, inTruth Syntax and Modality, ed. H. Leblanc, Amsterdam, 1973, pp. 48–75.

  2. N.B. Cocchiarella, ‘On the Primary and Secondary Semantics of Logical Necessity’,Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (1975), pp. 13–27.

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  3. W. Craig, ‘On Axiomatizability Within a System’,The Journal of Symbolic Logic 18 (1953), pp. 30–32.

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  4. J.M. Dunn, (Abstract), “Comments on N.D. Belnap, Jr.'s ‘Conditional Assertion and Restricted Quantification’,”Noûs 4 (1970), p. 13.

  5. J.M. Dunn and N.D. Belnap Jr., ‘The Substitution Interpretation of the Quantifiers’,Noûs 2 (1968), pp. 177–185.

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  6. D. Kaplan,Foundations of Intensional Logic, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of California at Los Angeles, 1964.

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  8. B.C. van Fraassen, ‘Belnap connectives’, forthcoming.

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This work was supported in part by NSF Grants GS-2648 and GS-33708. Its substance was reported in my comments on Belnap's paper in the symposium onQuantification and Generality at the American Philosophical Association's Western Division Meeting, St. Louis, May, 1970. A mimeo version was then in private circulation, and there was a rather vague abstract [4] (required for publication much in advance of the actual presentation). The main thrust of these results is in harmony with an (independent) suggestion due to W. V. O. Quine (another symposium participant) that it might be fruitful to consider Belnap's conditional assertion in the setting of three-valued logic, rather than in the modal logic setting given it by Belnap. Cf. esp. § 3 and § 8.

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Dunn, J.M. Axiomatizing Belnap's conditional assertion. J Philos Logic 4, 383–397 (1975). https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00558756

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