Advertisement

Journal of Philosophical Logic

, Volume 19, Issue 3, pp 229–252 | Cite as

Paradoxes of fulfillment

  • Daniel Bonevac
Article
  • 28 Downloads

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  1. N. Asher and H. Kamp, 1986, “The Knower's Paradox and Representational Theories of Attitudes,” in J. Halpern (ed.),Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge. Los Angeles: Morgan Kaufmann, 131–148.Google Scholar
  2. N. Asher and H. Kamp, 1988, “Self-Reference, Attitudes and Paradox,” in R. Turner and G. Chierchia (ed.),Property Theory. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.Google Scholar
  3. D. Bonevac and T. K. Seung, 1988, “Conflict in Practical Reasoning,”Philosophical Studies 53, 315–345.Google Scholar
  4. T. Burge, 1979, “Semantical Paradox,”The Journal of Philosophy 76, 169–198.Google Scholar
  5. B. Chellas, 1980,Modal Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
  6. M. Dummett, 1978, “Truth,” inTruth and Other Enigmas. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1–24.Google Scholar
  7. A. Gupta, 1982, “Truth and Paradox,”Journal of Philosophical Logic 12, 1–60.Google Scholar
  8. A. Gupta, 1987, “The Meaning of Truth,” in E. LePore (ed.),New Directions in Semantics. London: Academic Press, 453–480.Google Scholar
  9. H. Herzberger, 1982, “Naive Semantics and the Liar Paradox,”Journal of Philosophy 79, 479–497.Google Scholar
  10. H. Herzberger, 1982, “Notes on Naive Semantics,”Journal of Philosophical Logic 12, 61–102.Google Scholar
  11. D. H. Hodgson, 1967,The Consequences of Utilitarianism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
  12. R. Koons, 1987,Analogues of the Liar Paradox in Systems of Epistemic Logic Representing Meta-mathematical Reasoning and Strategic Rationality in Non-cooperative Games. PhD dissertation: University of California at Los Angeles.Google Scholar
  13. R. Koons, 1988a, “A Formalization of Burge's Solution to the Liar,” manuscript.Google Scholar
  14. R. Koons, 1988b, “A Representational Account of Mutual Belief,” manuscript.Google Scholar
  15. S. Kripke, 1975, “Outline of a Theory of Truth,”Journal of Philosophy 72, 690–716.Google Scholar
  16. R. B. Marcus, 1982, “Moral Dilemmas and Consistency,”Journal of Philosophy 77, 121–136.Google Scholar
  17. A. Martinich, 1983, “A Pragmatic Solution to the Liar Paradox,”Philosophical Studies 43, 63–67.Google Scholar
  18. R. Montague, 1963, “Syntactical Treatments of Modality, with Corollaries on Reflection Principles and Finite Axiomatizability,”Acta Philosophica Fennica, Proceedings of a Colloquium on Modal and Many-Valued Logics, 153–167. Reprinted in R. Thomason (ed.),Formal Philosophy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 286–302.Google Scholar
  19. C. Parsons, 1974, “The Liar Paradox,”Journal of Philosophical Logic 3, 381–412.Google Scholar
  20. D. Regan, 1980,Utilitarianism and Cooperation. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
  21. R. Thomason, 1980, “A Note on Syntactical Treatments of Modality,”Synthese 44, 391–395.Google Scholar
  22. B. Williams, 1973, “Ethical Consistency,” inProblems of the Self. New York: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Kluwer Academic Publishers 1990

Authors and Affiliations

  • Daniel Bonevac
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Texas at AustinAustinUSA

Personalised recommendations